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This note investigates the behaviour of national trade unions facing
international mobile capital. It is now widely recognized, that the world of
today is characterized by high international capital mobility and integrated
production across national borders. Thus, suppliers of more or less
immobile factors have to be conscious about this restraint on their
behaviour. They have to compete for mobile capital just like suppliers of
private goods have to compete for customers. A widely disseminated model
of trade union behaviour is that of a monopoly trade union, with a large and
powerful union fixing the wage rate and firms, which subsequently
determine labour demand by adjusting their employment.
1 Under capital
mobility, this model has to be replaced by that of an oligopoly trade union,
with a countable number of trade unions fixing the wage rate
noncooperatively. Oligopolistic trade union behaviour has already been
treated by some authors in a national context. At first glance, their results
seem to be transferable to an international context.
2 However, this paper,
which derives labour demand explicitly from a model of international
production, obtains results very different from these oligopoly trade union
models.
* I would like to thank Henning KJodt, Rainer Maurer and Karl-Heinz Paqu6 for helpful
comments.
^ee for instance Oswald (1985).
2See Os\vald(1979), Gylfason/Lindbeck (1984) for noncooperative wage setting and
Davidson (1988) for cooperative wage setting.-2-
2. The Bertrand-Edgeworth Character of Noncooperative Wage Setting
Oligopoly theory divides competition up into Cournot competition, where
the instrument variables are output quantities, and Bertrand-competition,
where the instrument variables are output prices. Theoretically, both kinds
of behaviour seem possible in wage setting games. However, quantitiy
competition has never been observed in labour markets, so that international
trade union competition should be modelled as price and therefore wage
competition. The players of this game are facing a capacity constraint: the
quantity of labour, which unions are able to offer, is restricted to the
number of its members. Therefore, the situation of national trade unions is
very similar to the capacity constrained version of the Bertrand-model,
which is known as the Bertrand-Edgeworth-model of oligopoly theory.
3
2.1 Description of the Game
The following model tries to capture the main features of international trade
union competition in a symmetric 2-2-2 (two countries, two factors, two
unions) model.
4 The two factors of production are perfectly mobile capital
(K) and perfectly immobile labour (L). The world capital stock K is
equally divided between 2n capital owners, n in each country. In each
country, capital owners can produce the consumption good x with the
production function x=F(K,L). The technology F(K,L) is homogenous of
degree 1 in capital and labour. Thus, with F(K,L)=L-f(K/L), the partial
derivatives read as follows:
3For a description of the Betrand-Edgeworth-model of price competition, see for instance
Tirole (1988, pp. 214 ) or Wolfstetter (1990, pp. 49).
4It thus differs from the 2-2-2-2 (two countries, two factors, two unions, two goods) model
of Kemp et al. (1992), who were introducing trade unions in the textbook models of
international trade.-3-
FK{K,L) = f'(K/L), (1)
FL(K,L) = f(K/L)-K/L-f'(K/L). (2)
In both countries, labour capacity is constrained to L. For simplicity, I
assume that L=l. Therefore it is possible, that the capital owners are
rationed in their labour usage: at comparably low wage rates they may want
to employ more workers than offered by the unions. In the following I
assume, that labour in this case is rationed proportionally between capital
owners. If the labour constraint is binding, then every capital owner obtains
the same amount of labour, namely l/2n. Given this rationing rule and the
wage rates wl and w2, the representative capital owner adjusts his capital
allocation and labour demand to solve the following programme:
5
max F{Kl,Ll) + FiK^L^-w^-w^, (3)
s.t. K1+K2<^, (4a)-(4g)
2n
The factor labour is uniformly unionized in each country. There is no
competition between labour suppliers within a country. This is, of course, a
rather simplistic assumption. In most countries there exist several trade
unions, usually organized sector- or regionwide. Furthermore, it neglects
competition between organized workers and those workers who are not
members of a trade union. Therefore, this model should not be seen as a
one-to-one' description of reality, but as a reference point: as the following
analysis will show, international trade union competition will lead to
competitive behaviour - even from this most non-competitive starting point.
i resp. Lt denotes capital resp. labour usage in country i.-4-
The whole wage setting game can be described as follows: First, the unions
of country 1 and 2 simultanously set the wage rate. Then, the capital owners






Figure 1: The Wage-Setting-Game
The solution to the second stage of the game is described by the Kuhn
Tucker conditions to the program (3) and (4).
7 With
6This game structure describes the situation where capital and labour can be allocated
freely during the "production period. Then capital owners can not credibly commit
themselves to a certain capital or labour stock.
7See Appendix.-5-
= f(K/L)-K/L-f'{K/L), they implicitly define the following
aggregate labour demand functions for both countries:
8
For Wj = g\K 12) and w2 = g[K 12) labour in both countries is fully
employed.
For wi ?£ g[K/2), the labour demand function posesses a discontinuity at
Now I turn to the decision problem of the trade unions. Given the result of
the labour demand subgame, their objective is to find the wage rate vv. that
maximizes their payoff function, which contains the wage rate of its
members and the resulting aggregate labour demand as arguments. For a
more detailed specification I assume, that the trade unions maximize the
expected utility of their representative member. Then their payoff function
is given by the following equation:
o), (6)
i,j = 1,2, i*j.
8For illustrative reasons, it is assumed, that for wx =w2 capital is always allocated
symetrically between the two countries. This need not to be the case for both wages equal
and higher than the full employment wage. However, this assumption has no influence on
the results of this paper, because it will be dropped for the determination of the wage
equilibria.-6-
C/(w;) represents the von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility if the
worker is employed, and U(w0) represents the vNM utility if he is not
employed and has to be contended with an unemployment benefit of w0. It
is assumed, that this unemployment benefit is always smaller than w..
Because of the underlying discontinous labour demand, the payoff function
is discontinous at wi=w;.
2.2 Solution of the Game
This section evaluates conditions that allow pure strategy equilibria to solve
the trade union game.
9 It shows, that these equilibria imply full employment
for both countries.
Lemma 1 reduces the set of possible strategy combinations to the set of full
employment wages. The succeeding Lemma 2 points to an important
relationship between the strategy combinations.
Lemma 1: Let vv* be the set of all symmetric pure equilibrium strategies for
player i. Then w]
Proof: Lemma 1 results from the discontinuity of the labur demand. Let
w1 = w2> g{K/2). Then the members of at least one union are not fully
employed. Their union could achieve full employment by marginally
underbidding its opponent with the amount Aw. The costs of such a policy
dU
were —— -Aw-L", whereas the benefits would be given by
aw
(u(w-Aw)-U(wo))(l-L"). For Aw-*0 the net benefit would be positive.
Thus, a symmetric Nash-equilibrium can only exist at v^ = w2 <g[K/2).
9For the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinous games like this one, see
Dasgupta/Maskin (1986), lemma 7.-7-
Lemma2: The strategy combination {g[K/2),g(K/2)\ is pareto superior to
all other W' = w* x w'2.
Proof: For all W', labour in both countries is fully employed. Therefore,
the payoff function for the unions equals the utility function of the
representative member. Then, because of the increasing utility function of
the union members, an equilibrium with both wages lower than gyK/2) is
pareto inferior to W*.
Lemma 2 has two implications: First, if more than one equilibrium exist,
and if one accepts the conjecture that pareto superior Nash equilibria are
more likely to be played, then the strategy combination \g{K/2), g{K/2)\ is
the focal point of the game. Second, if there is only one equilibrium, then it
will be the strategy combination \g(K/2), g{K/2)}.
With the help of these two lemmas and with the following assumption and
two definitions, I am able two derive Proposition 1, which characterizes the












10This assumption is equivalent to the assumption, that the second order conditon of
expected utility maximization of a monopoly trade union is satisfied. This is usually done
in the literature.-8-
Proposition 1: Suppose I{K) < 0. Then there exists at least one equilibrium
in pure strategies, W' =w[ Xw'2> with w] c[o,^(^/2)], i=l,2. Iffl{K.)>Q,
then no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies, that the necessary conditions for the existence of
the equilibrium \g{K/2), g[K/2)\ are necessary for the existence of all
other possible symmetric equilibria. Thus, nonexistence of any symmetric
equilibrium occurs, iff, for a given vv2 = g{K/2), union 1 could play
wx=g{K/2) + e, with £*0 and obtain V(g(K/2) + e)>v(^K/2j). For
w2 = g{K/2), aggregate labour demand in country 1 is given by:
T" =
0 for
for Wl < g{K/2)
for giKll^w.K^K). (9)
Note, that v(g{K/2)) = u{g{K/2))-U{w0).
Let £<0. Then v(g(K/2) + e) = u{g{K/2) + e)-U{w0). From
dU(wi)/dwi>0 follows v(g(K/2) + e)<v(g(K/2)). Thus, underbidding
of Wj = g[K/2) does not pay.
Let £>0. Then v(g(K/2) + e) = H(K,g{K/2) + e). If I(K)<0, then,
because of \ 2'
W"<0, H{K,g(K/2) + e)<H(K,g{K/2)). From
equations (7) and (8) follows H(K,g(K/2)) = v(g{K/2)). Thus
v[g(K/2) + e) < v(g(K/2)). Deviation from w1 = g{K/2) does not pay.
If, however, I(K)>0, then for £* =argmaxH(K,g(K/2) +
v(g(K/2) + e')>V[g(K/2)). Deviation does pay, wl= g{K/2) is not
optimal, {g(K/2),g[K/2)\ is no Nash equilibrium and, because of Lemma
2, no other symmetric pure strategy equilibrium will be found.-9-
Finally, there is to show, that no assymetric pure strategy equilibrium exists
in this game. Suppose, wx>w2. Then v(w2) = U(w2)-U(w0). Because
dU{w2)
— > 0, no optimal w, can be found and therefore no assymetric
equilibrium exists, q.e.d.
Proposition 1 shows that the Bertrand-paradox also appears in our model of
international trade union competition. Even with only two unions, the
equilibrium wage - if it exists in pure strategies - settles at a full
employment level. This is of course due to the discontinuity of the labour
demand function. Because the producers can costlessy reallocate capital
between the two countries, and because of constant returns to scale, they
first demand the whole amount of cheap labour before falling back upon the
labour in the high wage country - just like buyers of a homogenous good in
the Bertrand-Edgeworth model. But in the Bertrand-Edgeworth-model, the
condition for the existence of a competitive pure strategy equilibrium differs
from the existence condition in this model. In the Bertrand-Edgeworth-
model, a competitive pure strategy equilibrium exists only if the capacities
of the producers are high enough to satisfy consumer demand at the
competitive price. Then the capacity constraint is no longer binding. In the
present model of trade union competition, the capacity constraint is always
binding, because it is assumed that w0 - the 'competitive' wage - is smaller
than the full employment wage. Nevertheless, there may also exist
equilibria in pure strategies, namely when the costs of a wage increase - due
to unemployment - are higher than the gains for the employed - due to the
wage increase. Then HyK^j has its maximum left of G{K/2) (see Figure
nFor illustrative reasons, it is assumed, that the unions are risk neutral, so that the full








Figure 2: Condition for the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
This condition can be interpreted in elasticity terms. Because of the
discontinuity of the payoff function in this model, elasiticities can only be
evaluated for w1 > G{K/2). An equilibrium in pure strategies exists, iff for
any wx > G{K/2) the wage elasticity of the utility fuction is smaller than the
absolute value of the wage elasticity of the labour demand. At a point
sufficiently close to the equilibrium point, both elasticities are directly
determined by the world capital-labour ratio, as equation (7) shows. But
unfortunately a clear relationship between these elasticities and the capital-
labour ratios cannot be established. Depending on the shape of the vNM
utility function and the production function, these elasticities may increase
or decrease with a rising capital-labour ratio.-11-
23 Comparison to the Monopoly Union Model
The preceeding section derived full employment equilibria for
This result has to be compared to the reference point, the case of no capital
mobility. With immobile capital, aggregate labour demand in country i is
given by:
Then, with Kt = KJ2, Proposition 2 follows immediately from the first




Define j{x) = U'(g{K/2))
K-g'(K/2)
Proposition 2: Suppose, capital is internationally immobile. Then the
equilibrium wage equals the full employment wage w.t = g\K/2j iff
Proof: If J{K)<0, then EU{w: +e)<EU{wi)\/e *0, because the
assumption d
 2H/d wf < 0 assures that the payoff function of the union is
strictly concave in w;. Therefore w] = g[K/2). q.e.d.
Note that J{K)>I(K)VK. Therefore, the set of K which implies full
employment equilibria in the monopoly union case is a subset of the set of
K, which implies full employment equilibria in the duopoly union case.
Thus, if there exist values of K for which a monopoly union sets the full
employment wage, then there exist values of K, which imply pure strategy
equilibria in the duopoly union case, but the opposite is not true.-12-
2.4 An Illustrative Example
In general, the existence conditions for a full employment equilibrium
{Q and I{K)<Q vary with the world capital-labour ratio. As
mentioned above, no simple relationship between these conditions and the
capital-labour ratio can be determined, because both the underlying labour
demand elasticities and the vNM utility elasiticities are affected by changes
in the capital labour ratio.
1
2 However, if the vNM utility functions exhibits
constant relative risk aversion, then the utility elasticity is also a constant
and the existence conditions can be interpreted easily. The vNM utility
function for constant relative risk aversion is given by:
-k
w? for 0< 1,0*0, (11)
for 0 = 0.
a=l-0 is defined as the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
Without loss of generality, the unemployment benefit WQ can be written as
a constant fraction of the full employment wage.
wo=u-g{K/2), (12)
0<M<l.
Then l{K) and J{K) can be rewritten as
, fi for 0*0
' ^
 0 > , (13)
•(fi + 2-lnu) for 0 = 0
fi
12Cf. Oswald (1982).Bibliofhek








•(fl + lnu) for 0 = 0
g'(K/2)'K/2
fi = 1— \— is the elasticity of the full employment wage with
respect to the world capital intensitiy. (13) and (14) show that a full
employment equilibrium is the more likely the higher the risk aversion, the







Figure 3: Existence Conditions for Full Employment Equilibria-14-
3. Conclusion
Noncooperative wage setting by national trade unions which face
international mobile capital is comparable to price setting of Bertrand-
Edgeworth-oligopolists. Not only the rules of the game, but also its outcome
resemble those of the Bertrand-Edgeworth-model. Therefore, both the
Bertrand-Paradox and the possibility of nonexisting pure strategy equilibria
also appear in this context. In the Bertrand-Edgeworth-model of oligopoly
theory, the competitive price is an equilibrium in pure strategies if the
production capacities are sufficiently large, so that the capacity constraint
actually does not bind. However, in the model of trade union competition,
the condition for existence is somewhat different. Pure strategy equilibria
exist, if the world capital-labour ratio determines a full employment wage
and labour demand function, which discourages wage increases, because
resulting unemployment is not fully offset by the utility gains for the
employed.
The results of this paper - full employment wages for a certain capital-
labour ratio and nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria in all other cases,
differ from other investigations of oligopolistic trade union behaviour,
which are mentioned in the introduction. Those models obtained interior
pure strategy equilibria somewhere in between the monopoly and the full
employment wage. This is because they either assumed ad-hoc a well
behaved labour demand function Li(wj,wj) with dL^dwj > 0 (Oswald,
1979), or derive the labour demand function from a one-factor production
function with diminishing returns (Davidson, 1988). Furthermore they did
not consider the capacity constraint by the trade unions.-15-
Appendix







K/2K-K, -K2 > 0, lJln-L, > 0, l/2n-L2 > 0,-16-
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